Methodology (Appendix A)

Register: think-tank sober. House style per the Genghis copy rules: no em or en dashes, no arrows; ranges in prose use "to". Citations are bound to numbered endnotes in first-appearance order; see the Notes at the foot. Internal workbook names do not appear; the public artefact is "the CLI dataset" (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20732509).

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A.1 The index at a glance

The Crypto Livability Index (CLI) measures how viable it is to live on cryptocurrency, meaning to receive, hold, and spend it as everyday money, in 79 countries. It is built from 22 sub-pillars organised under five pillars: market access and liquidity, the legal and regulatory framework, real-world spendability, macro and digital infrastructure, and the community ecosystem. Each sub-pillar scores every country on an integer scale from 0 to 4, with one consistent direction: higher means more livable on crypto.

All evidence is assessed at a hard cutoff of 31 December 2025. The CLI publishes two rankings derived from the same underlying scores. Table 1 (rails) sums 21 sub-pillars into a raw capability score out of 84: the best overall crypto environment, full stop. Table 2 (livability) reweights that score by the Crypto Necessity Index (CNI), a five-component measure of how much a population actually depends on crypto as financial infrastructure rather than holding it as a discretionary asset. Table 1 answers "where is the environment best?"; Table 2 answers "where could someone realistically live on crypto, and where do they already need to?"

Three design commitments run through everything that follows. First, ground reality over legal posture: a statute is evidence, not a verdict, and scores reflect what residents can actually do. Second, uniformity of method: every country is scored against the same written bands, verified through the same process, with no per-country exceptions. Third, disclosure over silence: every estimate, gap-fill, and limitation in the dataset is flagged in this appendix rather than left for readers to discover.

A.2 Country universe

The CLI covers 79 countries, selected to span every region, income level, and regulatory posture relevant to consumer crypto use, from constitutional adoption to criminal prohibition. The universe is fixed for this edition; countries are neither added nor dropped mid-cycle.

For analysis and verification the 79 are organised into eight regional buckets:

• Pioneers and top tier: El Salvador, UAE, Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Bahrain
• Major Western friction: USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal
• EU MiCA transition and CEE:¹ Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Romania, Belarus, Georgia
• APAC established and hubs: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, India
• LATAM and Ukraine: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, Venezuela, Cuba, Ukraine
• MENA and Russia: Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Russia
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia
• South Asia, frontier APAC and Central Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan

Verification passes were run bucket by bucket, some on the regional scheme above and some on an alphabetical split of the same 79, so that every score was checked against peers in a fixed cohort. The universe is identical in either scheme; only the grouping differs.

A.3 The pillar tree

Twenty-two sub-pillars are active in this edition.

Pillar 1: Market Access & Liquidity. Can you get crypto with local money?

• P1.1 Exchange access. A weighted composite over the on-ramp methods offered by CoinMarketCap's top-300 exchanges for the local fiat.² Methods are weighted by quality (a direct bank rail outweighs a card integration, which outweighs a third-party gateway or P2P), and each method's exchange count is capped to enforce diminishing returns. For sanctioned or domestic-only markets invisible to international aggregators, documented domestic platforms are added to the counts before computing the composite; the adjustment is to the inputs, never to the final score.
• P1.2 P2P liquidity (bonus sub-pillar; see A.6). Peer-to-peer market depth, scored on quintiles with a two-track design: open markets are scored from adoption-index rank; banned or sanctioned markets are scored from direct P2P evidence, because in those jurisdictions a low rank on web-traffic-based indices signals invisibility, not absence.
• P1.3 ATM density. Crypto ATMs³ per million residents of the three largest cities, on absolute thresholds.⁴
• P1.4 On-ramp/off-ramp friction. Friction in both directions between fiat and crypto: KYC burden, bank willingness both ways, capital controls, and documented account freezes in 2024 and 2025.
• P1.5 Stablecoin access. Availability of USDT and USDC with a local-fiat on-ramp, assessed across three channels (centralised exchanges, P2P, DeFi) whose flags must be internally consistent with the score.

Pillar 2: Legal & Regulatory Framework. Is living on crypto lawful, and at what cost?

• P2.1 Legal status, from general ban (0) to legal tender (4); no country scores 4 at the cutoff.⁵
• P2.2 Tax treatment, the personal tax burden on crypto gains, from a true zero (4) to punishing rates or criminalisation (0).
• P2.3 Income legality, whether wages can lawfully be paid in crypto; a country with a general ban is floored at 0 here (income in a banned asset is not legal income).
• P2.4 Consumer KYC burden, the identity cost of acquiring crypto, scored inverted (higher = freer). The top band (no KYC required as a practical norm) is empty across all 79 countries at the cutoff: under FATF Travel Rule adoption, even collapse-state markets verify identity at the platform layer users actually transact on.⁶
• P2.5 Regulatory trajectory, the direction of travel at the cutoff, from actively tightening (0) to actively liberalising (4). Legislated-but-not-yet-effective changes are scored here and only here.

Pillar 3: Real-World Utility & Spendability. Can you actually pay for life?

• P3.1 Gift cards and vouchers. Distinct brands purchasable with crypto.⁷⁸
• P3.2 Direct merchants. Documented merchants accepting crypto at the point of sale; exchanges and licensing infrastructure do not count as merchants.
• P3.3 Crypto debit and prepaid cards. Graded by the depth of the card stack, from multiple locally-licensed ("Tier-1") cards down to exclusion from all major providers' coverage, verified against providers' live country restriction lists.⁹
• P3.4 Utility bill coverage. How many of six bill categories (rent, electricity, water, fixed internet, post-paid mobile, gas) can be paid in crypto through at least one in-country provider. The hardest and most discriminating spendability test: most countries score 0.
• P3.5 Connectivity. Mobile airtime, data, and eSIM purchasable with crypto, the broadest rail in the pillar.⁷⁸

Pillar 4: Macro & Digital Infrastructure. Are the preconditions in place?

• P4.1 Internet penetration and P4.2 smartphone penetration, in identical absolute bands; P4.2 is scored on unique owners, deliberately discarding multi-SIM connection counts that exceed 100% of population.¹⁰ (P4.3 and P4.5 were retired before this edition; the sub-pillar numbering is held stable for cross-edition comparison.)
• P4.4 Remittance corridor activity. The estimated crypto share of inbound remittances. This is the index's one double-edged sub-pillar: a high score signals that crypto already functions as survival infrastructure, which correlates with sanctions, inflation, and capital controls. Table 1 reads it as capability; Table 2 reads it as need. Both readings are correct, and the text says so wherever the score is quoted.

Pillar 5: Community, Media & Developer Ecosystem. Is there a local scene to plug into?

• P5.1 Meetup and event activity, 2025 events normalised by the log of the crypto-user base, in z-score quintiles.
• P5.2 Crypto media, active local-language and locally-focused English outlets in a fixed September to December 2025 window.
• P5.3 Social sentiment, Google Trends search interest (Q4 2025) composited from three keyword baskets so that no single narrative dominates.¹¹
• P5.4 Web3 developer density, Web3 developers as a share of the national software-developer footprint (Electric Capital;¹² GitHub Innovation Graph¹³), in strict rank quintiles.

A.4 Scoring conventions

Scale types are fixed per sub-pillar. Seventeen sub-pillars use absolute, criterion-referenced bands (a brand count, a penetration percentage, a legal test); P1.2, P5.1, P5.3, and P5.4 use relative quintiles across the 79, because their underlying quantities have no natural absolute thresholds; P1.1 uses a points-threshold composite. Quintile scores are relative standings within this edition's sample: a country can improve in absolute terms and still drop a band if peers improve faster. Cutoff discipline. Only facts true on or before 31 December 2025 move a score. Later events, and legislated changes not yet in force at the cutoff, are recorded as trajectory evidence in P2.5 or as flagged items for the next edition. Cross-pillar rules. A general legal ban (P2.1 = 0) floors income legality (P2.3) at 0. A banking-rail ban and a domain-level ISP block are different mechanisms, scored in different sub-pillars, and never double-counted. Converting crypto to fiat and then paying (the manual off-ramp) does not count as crypto acceptance anywhere in Pillar 3: a provider must accept crypto directly, though regulated background bridges that are invisible to the user (a stablecoin-to-SEPA bridge behind a single payment action) do count as direct. Direction. Higher is more livable everywhere, with P2.4 inverted by construction (higher = freer) and P4.4 double-edged as described above.

A.5 Verification

Every one of the 1,738 individual scores (21 summed sub-pillars plus the P1.2 bonus, 22 in all, × 79 countries) passed through a three-layer process:¹⁴

• Baseline: the score in the working dataset, inherited from the index's earlier internal versions.
• Model-assisted revision: an independent re-derivation of each score from current sources, producing a proposed correction list.
• Human verification: a per-bucket review of every proposed score against the December 2025 record: regulator publications, statutes and court decisions, World Bank and IMF data, DataReportal and GSMA penetration data,¹⁵ Chainalysis adoption data,¹⁶ PwC tax summaries,¹⁷ and the live country-coverage lists of the relevant commercial providers (card programmes, gift-card platforms, top-up services).¹⁸ Where layers disagreed, the verification pass ruled, and the ruling was documented with sources.

Two correction principles governed the verification pass, and recur throughout the per-country evidence:

• Do not penalise on a ban citation without checking ground reality. Several countries' baseline scores rested on the existence of a prohibition rather than on what residents can actually do; verification corrected both directions: restoring scores where informal rails demonstrably function, and cutting them where a cited legal opening has no usable infrastructure behind it.
• Do not reward infrastructure that is not consumer usage. Licensing regimes, registered VASP counts, and exchange headquarters are not evidence that a resident can buy groceries; scores in Pillar 3 in particular were cut where baseline data had conflated regulatory presence with usable rails.

The full per-country evidence base (sources, source text, and reasoning for every score) is retained in the project archive and summarised in the country profiles (Appendix B).

A.6 Aggregation: the rails ranking

The rails score is the unweighted sum of 21 sub-pillars, for a maximum of 84 points. No pillar weighting is applied within Raw: weighting schemes among heterogeneous pillars are an unresolvable degrees-of-freedom problem in composite indices, and the unweighted sum is the most transparent and reproducible choice. Readers who prefer a different emphasis can reweight from the published dataset.

One sub-pillar is deliberately excluded from the sum. P1.2 (P2P liquidity) is held out as a bonus differentiator because it is necessity-correlated: it co-moves with the Crypto Necessity Index (correlation ≈ +0.49) and with capital controls (≈ +0.50) but is nearly orthogonal to the rest of the Raw score (≈ −0.03). Folding it into Raw would smuggle need into the capability score and then double-count it when Table 2 multiplies by the need multiplier. It is published per country as a tie-breaker and diagnostic.

A.7 The livability ranking

Table 2 re-ranks the same Raw scores by how much each population needs crypto as financial infrastructure:

```

Adjusted = (Raw / 84) × NeedMultiplier

NeedMultiplier = 0.5 + 1.5 × CNI

```

The Crypto Necessity Index (CNI) is the equal-weighted mean of five components, each normalised onto a 0 to 1 scale (the basis for each is given below):

Design notes, in brief. The three-year inflation average captures the monetary regime rather than a post-crisis bounce. The clamps (50% inflation, 25% remittance dependence) cap the influence of extreme observations; values above them are economically equivalent for the question at hand: the fiat system is failing as a store of value or the economy runs on inflows. The multiplier maps CNI ∈ [0, 1] onto [0.5×, 2.0×]. A country at the midpoint of the CNI scale (CNI = 0.33) sits at a neutral 1.0×, so the multiplier reads as a discount below that point and a premium above it. In this edition the median country's CNI is 0.16, so the typical country is discounted and only high-necessity populations are lifted, which is the intended behaviour: the difference between a country's two ranks stays interpretable. The realised multiplier in this edition runs from 0.52× (Switzerland) to 1.71× (Cuba), since no country's CNI reaches 0 or 1. The form is multiplicative by intent: maximum need cannot lift a country with no usable rails, which is what keeps broken-rails economies from topping a livability table.

A disclosed overlap: CNI's remittance dependence (share of GDP) is a different quantity from P4.4's crypto share of remittances, but the two correlate mildly; the report quotes them together only with that caveat.

Equal weights and the clamps are confirmed design choices of this edition, set before publication and frozen; the published dataset permits any reader to reweight. Gap-fills. Where a primary feed lacks a country, the value is filled from the closest credible alternate and flagged `est.` in the published dataset, with the basis stated:

A.8 Sensitivity analysis: the capital-controls vintage

The CNI's capital-control component uses Chinn-Ito KAOPEN 2023, the latest release of the peer-reviewed academic standard, applied uniformly to all 79 countries.²³ The vintage matters: at least twelve countries enacted documented capital-account policy changes during 2024 and 2025 that KAOPEN 2023 cannot reflect, the most prominent being Argentina's April 2025 removal of individual FX restrictions (the cepo).^{282930313233343536373839}

We considered and rejected two alternatives. Selectively re-scoring only the countries with known 2024 and 2025 events would break vintage uniformity within the component: an event screen reliably catches loud reforms and misses quiet ones, which systematically advantages high-profile reformers. Hand-re-scoring all 79 countries against 2024 and 2025 policy would replace a citable, reproducible academic source with the authors' own judgments on seventy-nine fronts. The principle adopted instead: vintages may differ across CNI components, each using its freshest uniform release, but never within one.

The twelve documented events are handled in two ways. Each carries a reader footnote at the affected country's entries. And the full set is published as a sensitivity scenario: the livability table recomputed with the twelve events scored, using stated scenario values (easing: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey; tightening: Belarus, Russia, Myanmar; reviewed and held: Bangladesh, Ukraine). The scenario values are assumptions, labelled as such; they are not data.

The result is the analysis's strongest robustness statement on the vintage question: the top of the livability table is insensitive to the vintage choice. Argentina ranks #1 and El Salvador #2 in both the published table and the scenario; movements are confined to mid-table (the largest being Sri Lanka, seven places). The 2026 edition will adopt the next KAOPEN release, which will incorporate the 2024 and 2025 events through the standard methodology.

A.9 Versioning and data freeze

The scoring dataset is versioned; this report publishes v1.3, frozen on 11 June 2026 after the verification passes and methodology decisions described above. The headline changes from the prior internal version were the split of stablecoin access into empirical and regulated channels, the rebuild of exchange access as a weighted composite, the tightening of the KYC top band (now empty), and roughly two hundred per-country corrections from the verification pass. The aggregation layer (Raw/84, the P1.2 holdout, and the CNI as specified in A.7) was frozen the same date. Post-freeze corrections, if any become necessary, will be published as an erratum with the affected ranks restated; nothing is silently edited.

A.10 Limitations

Stated plainly, in the authors' own assessment of where the index is weakest:

• Estimates where no data exists. Cuba's unbanked share and remittance dependence have no authoritative source; Myanmar's unbanked share rests on sector studies rather than a survey. All are flagged `est.` in the dataset and bounded where possible. Removing Cuba from Table 2 would not change the relative order of the countries ranked above it.
• The capital-controls vintage (A.8). Mitigated by uniformity, footnotes, and the published sensitivity scenario; not eliminated.
• Survey vintages differ across countries within the unbanked component where Findex 2025 lacks coverage (Belarus is the oldest, 2021). Flagged per country.
• De jure / de facto gaps. The index measures both legal posture (P2) and ground reality (P1, P3), but enforcement intensity is hard to observe; the "material" enforcement flags in the legal-status evidence mark countries where the gap is widest (India, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey).
• Relative scales move with the cohort. Quintile-scored sub-pillars (P1.2, P5.1, P5.3, P5.4) describe standing within these 79 countries in this edition, not absolute levels; cross-edition comparisons for those sub-pillars require care.
• Public-activity bias in ecosystem measures. P5.4 sees public repository activity only; closed-source and state-sector development is invisible. P5.1 cannot count private or underground events in ban jurisdictions, by design, since auditable evidence is the standard.
• Provider coverage data is point-in-time. Card, gift-card, and top-up coverage was verified against providers' live restriction lists near the cutoff; commercial coverage changes faster than any annual index can track.
• Equal weighting is a choice, both across the 21 sub-pillars in Raw and across the five CNI components. It is the most transparent default, it is disclosed, and the published dataset lets any reader substitute their own weights. Weight and clamp-threshold sensitivity were not formally tested in this edition; a reweighting and clamp-robustness check is planned for the next.
• Desk research, single edition. Scores were verified by a small team against documentary evidence, not by in-country panels. The structure anticipates that future editions will add primary fieldwork where this edition relies on documentation.

A.11 Reproducibility and data availability

The complete dataset (all 79 × 22 sub-pillar scores, the CNI components with vintages and `est.` flags, both rankings, and the sensitivity scenario) is published alongside this report under its own DOI (10.5281/zenodo.20732509, Zenodo, CC BY 4.0); the report itself carries DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20732507. The livability ranking and the sensitivity scenario regenerate deterministically from the published inputs with the published build script; the formula contains no fitted parameters. Sources for every per-country claim are listed in the endnotes; live-web sources (provider coverage lists, catalogues) are cited via archived snapshots taken at the access date, so that every citation remains verifiable after the underlying pages change.

Corrections and methodological correspondence: research@genghis.pro.

Notes

1. European Union, *Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), Regulation (EU) 2023/1114* (2023), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260605121143/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj.
2. CoinMarketCap, *Top-300 spot exchanges by volume (on-ramp methods by fiat)* (2025), https://coinmarketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260520155315/https://coinmarketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/.
3. Coin ATM Radar, *Crypto ATM installations by country* (2025), https://coinatmradar.com/countries/.
4. SimpleMaps (Pareto Software), *Basic World Cities Database, v1.901* (2025), https://simplemaps.com/data/world-cities. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260601154221/https://simplemaps.com/data/world-cities.
5. Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, *Cryptocurrency Regulation Tracker* (2025), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/geoeconomics-center/cryptoregulationtracker/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260601124644/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/geoeconomics-center/cryptoregulationtracker/.
6. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), *FATF Recommendations / Travel Rule (R.16) guidance on VASPs* (2012), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260609110416/https://www.fatf-gafi.org/.
7. Bitrefill, *Gift cards, airtime/eSIM and bill catalogue (country coverage)* (2025), https://www.bitrefill.com/.
8. Coinsbee, *Gift card and top-up catalogue (country/brand coverage)* (2025), https://www.coinsbee.com/. Archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260616135557/https://www.coinsbee.com/en/.
9. RedotPay, *Crypto card country-coverage / availability* (2025), https://www.redotpay.com/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260531173240/https://www.redotpay.com/.
10. DataReportal (Kepios / We Are Social / Meltwater), *Digital 2026: Global Overview Report* (2026), https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2026-global-overview-report. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260602193421/https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2026-global-overview-report.
11. Google Trends, *Search interest, Q4 2025 (three keyword baskets)* (2025), https://trends.google.com/trends/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260616091058/https://trends.google.com/trends/.
12. Electric Capital, *Developer Report* (2025), https://www.developerreport.com/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260610151623/https://www.developerreport.com/.
13. GitHub, *Innovation Graph* (2025), https://innovationgraph.github.com/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260602100653/https://innovationgraph.github.com/.
14. Genghis Research, *The CLI dataset (79×22 scores, CNI inputs, both rankings, sensitivity scenario)* (2025), https://genghis.pro/crypto-livability-index.
15. GSMA Intelligence, *Mobile/smartphone penetration data* (2025), https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260519190240/https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/.
16. Chainalysis, *The 2025 Geography of Cryptocurrency Report / Global Adoption Index* (2025), https://www.chainalysis.com/reports/2025-geo-crypto-report/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260509225024/https://www.chainalysis.com/reports/2025-geo-crypto-report/.
17. PwC, *Worldwide Tax Summaries (Online)* (2025), https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260616134805/https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/.
18. Multiple commercial providers, *Provider live country-coverage lists (card, gift-card, top-up, bill-pay)* (2025), official locator not yet published.
19. Council on Foreign Relations (Steil & Harding), *Global Inflation Tracker* (2023), https://www.cfr.org/trackers/global-inflation-tracker. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260301220514/https://www.cfr.org/trackers/global-inflation-tracker.
20. International Monetary Fund, *IMF AREAER + CPI data; El Salvador EFF program* (2024), https://www.imf.org/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20251101052825/https://imf.org/.
21. World Bank, *The Global Findex Database 2025* (2025), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globalfindex. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260610091320/https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globalfindex.
22. World Bank / KNOMAD, *Migration and Development Brief 40 (remittances, % of GDP)* (2024), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migration/brief/remittances-knomad. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260614071434/https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migration/brief/remittances-knomad.
23. Chinn, M. D. & Ito, H. (Portland State University), *The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN), 2023 release* (2023), https://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260303123244/https://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm.
24. US Treasury OFAC; SWIFT, *OFAC sanctions listings & SWIFT access status (hand-graded at cutoff)* (2025), https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260610162130/https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/.
25. CGAP, *Myanmar financial-inclusion sector study* (2024), https://www.cgap.org/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260609230712/https://www.cgap.org/.
26. Roland Berger, *Myanmar banking/financial-services analysis* (2024), https://www.rolandberger.com/.
27. The Heritage Foundation, *Index of Economic Freedom (capital-controls gap-fill)* (2026), https://www.heritage.org/index/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260212005147/https://www.heritage.org/index/.
28. US Dept of Commerce (trade.gov); BCRA / MercoPress, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Argentina (easing to removal of individual FX restrictions (cepo), Apr 2025)* (2024), https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/argentina-eliminates-capital-controls-and-payment-timelines. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260616163040/https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/argentina-eliminates-capital-controls-and-payment-timelines.
29. Council on Foreign Relations; AP, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Egypt (easing to FX liberalisation / pound float, 2024)* (2024), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-egypts-economic-overhaul-stave-crisis. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260304230557/https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-egypts-economic-overhaul-stave-crisis.
30. IMF (Country Report No. 24/318); African Business, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Ethiopia (easing to FX regime liberalisation, 2024)* (2024), https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2024/English/1ethea2024002-print-pdf.ashx. Archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260128150147/https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1ethea2024002-print-pdf.pdf.
31. Central Bank of Nigeria; Punch, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Nigeria (easing to naira/FX liberalisation, 2024)* (2024), https://www.cbn.gov.ng/intops/FXMarket.html. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260218015621/https://www.cbn.gov.ng/intops/FXMarket.html.
32. IMF (Country Report No. 24/311); The Express Tribune, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Pakistan (easing to FX measures, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2024/English/1pakea2024004-print-pdf.ashx. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20250515141031/https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2024/English/1pakea2024004-print-pdf.ashx.
33. EconomyNext; Xinhua, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Sri Lanka (easing to relaxation of crisis-era controls, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-to-lift-all-vehicle-import-restrictions-by-february-2025-minister-179540/. Archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260616142904/https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-to-lift-all-vehicle-import-restrictions-by-february-2025-minister-179540/.
34. CBRT; Daily Sabah, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Turkey (easing to normalisation of FX measures, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://tcmbblog.org/wps/wcm/connect/blog/en/main+menu/analyses/exit+from+kkm+accounts. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260404092159/https://tcmbblog.org/wps/wcm/connect/blog/en/main+menu/analyses/exit+from+kkm+accounts.
35. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor; US Dept of State, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Belarus (tightening to capital-account restriction, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/242/tightens-mandatory-foreign-exchange-conversion-rules-. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260616143053/https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/242/tightens-mandatory-foreign-exchange-conversion-rules-.
36. Interfax; Carnegie Endowment, *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Russia (tightening to capital-control measures, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/111539/. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20251207132808/https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/111539/.
37. Allen & Gledhill; Central Bank of Myanmar (Notification 37/2024), *2024 to 2025 capital-account event to Myanmar (tightening to FX/capital restriction, 2024 to 2025)* (2024), https://www.allenandgledhill.com/publication/articles/28938/central-bank-of-myanmar-requires-exporters-to-exchange-25-of-their-earnings-at-central-bank-rate. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20260616143341/https://www.allenandgledhill.com/publication/articles/28938/central-bank-of-myanmar-requires-exporters-to-exchange-25-of-their-earnings-at-central-bank-rate.
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